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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Following remand, Keith A. Brown appeals from the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress incriminating statements about an Idaho homicide, made to a
detective when Brown was in custody in Florida.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The facts underlying Brown’s convictions and the proceedings through his initial
appeal were described by the district court as follows:
The facts surrounding this case are set forth in State v. Brown, 155
Idaho 423, 313 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2013) review denied (Dec. 9, 2013). In
that decision the Court of Appeals affirmed on all issues except the motion
to suppress. The issue originally presented to this court was whether
Brown was mentally capable of voluntarily confessing. However, as noted
by the appellate court, Brown abandoned that issue on appeal and instead
now argues that his suppression motion should have been granted
because the State presented no evidence whatsoever to meet its burden
of proving that his statements were voluntary. Id. 155 Idaho at 431, 313
P.3d at 759. The case was remanded for a new hearing on the
voluntariness or involuntariness of Brown’s statements to Lieutenant Long.
Brown was originally charged with the murder of Les Breaw;
however, pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to voluntary
manslaughter reserving his right to appeal the pretrial motions, including
the motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals summarized the facts
surrounding Brown’s confession as follows:
On March 20, the day after the body was found, Brown was
arrested in Florida on a fugitive warrant from Idaho. Before
he was extradited to Idaho on the grand theft charge, Brown
and Tyrah [Brown’s wife] were interviewed by Florida law
enforcement officials. In these interviews, the Browns made
a number of incriminating statements. When asked about
Breaw’s $50,000 escrow check, Brown claimed that the
money was owed to him because of services he had
rendered Breaw, but eventually Tyrah confessed to forging
Breaw’s name on the escrow check. Tyrah also confessed
1

to shooting Breaw and hiding his body. According to Tyrah,
she had done it because Breaw had raped her. When
Brown was told that his wife had confessed, he also
confessed to killing Breaw and told officers that Tyrah was
not there.[1] According to Brown, he and Breaw had gone
shooting that day, and during the outing Breaw offered
Brown the escrow check so that Brown would forgive Breaw
for Breaw’s sexual misconduct with Tyrah. Breaw continued,
however, to make disparaging remarks about Tyrah, which
ultimately prompted Brown to shoot Breaw. Brown said that
he buried Breaw in the snow and hid the murder weapon
nearby. Brown even drew a map to the gun’s location to
persuade officers that Tyrah was not involved. By the next
day, however, Brown’s story had changed. He recanted his
story about killing Breaw and instead told the Florida officers
that shooting Breaw had been an accident.
Id., 155 Idaho at 427-28, 313 P.3d at 755-56.
(R., pp.132-133 (explanation added).)
On remand, a second suppression motion hearing was held in which, according
to the district court, Brown contended “the police threatened to arrest his wife if he did
not confess, thus rendering his confession involuntary.” (R., p.134.) Following the
hearing, the district court concluded, “the State has carried its burden of proof
establishing that the statements made by Brown were voluntary[,]” and denied Brown’s
motion to suppress. (R., pp.135-136.) Brown filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.137-141, 145-148.)

1

Detective Long testified at the October 7, 2014 hearing on Brown’s suppression
motion that he told Brown during the March 22, 2007 interview that Tyrah said that she
had killed Mr. Breaw. (10/7/14 Tr., p.46, Ls.16-23; p.53, Ls.7-13; p.54, Ls.10-13; p.55,
Ls.13-15.) However, as will be discussed more fully, see Argument, § C, pp.13-16 and
n. 4, infra, a review of the March 22nd videotaped interview (St. Ex. 2) reveals that
Detective Long did not inform Brown that Tyrah confessed to being solely responsible
for killing Mr. Breaw.
2

ISSUE
Brown states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Brown’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Brown failed to show error in the district court’s determination that his
custodial statements to a detective in Florida were voluntary?

3

ARGUMENT
Brown Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That His
Custodial Statements To A Detective In Florida Were Voluntary
A.

Introduction
Upon remand, the district court held a hearing on Brown’s motion to suppress to

determine whether his confession was voluntary.

After concluding that the general

circumstances weighed in favor of a finding of “voluntariness,” the court focused on
Brown’s primary assertion that his confession was coerced because “the police
threatened to arrest his wife if he did not confess, thus rendering his confession
involuntary.” (R., p.134.) After the hearing, the court held that, because Brown’s wife
(Tyrah) was arrested and prosecuted for a period of time for the first degree murder of
Leslie Breaw following Detective Long’s March 22, 2007 interview with Brown, under
State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001), any threats (implied or
express) by the detective to arrest Tyrah were valid and did not render Brown’s
confession involuntary. (R., p.135.)
On appeal, Brown argues “that his confession was the product of psychological
coercion by Detective Long, who manipulated Mr. Brown’s immense concern for his wife
and any adverse consequences to her due to her confession to the same crime.”
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8 (emphasis added).) Brown further argues that “Detective Long’s
implied threats of prosecution or harm to Tyrah were unjustified” and his “implied threats
of consequences to Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time.” (Appellant’s
Brief, p.14.) Brown’s argument fails regardless of whether Detective Long threatened in
any way to arrest Tyrah for killing Leslie Breaw.
4

B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,
496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). Thus, where an appellant claims his statements
were involuntary, this Court gives “deference to the lower court’s findings of fact, if they
are not clearly erroneous,” but engages in “free review over the question of whether the
facts found are constitutionally sufficient to show voluntariness.” State v. Wilson, 126
Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). The “ultimate determination of
voluntariness” is a legal question freely reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
287 (1991).
C.

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Brown’s Statements Were Voluntary
“[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession

is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).

“Indeed, coercive

government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme] Court’s seminal confession
case,” Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), and “the cases considered by th[e]
Court” post-Brown “have focused upon the crucial element of police overreaching.”
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163. “While each confession case has turned on its own set of
factors justifying the conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained
a substantial element of coercive police conduct.”
5

Id. at 163-164.

“Absent police

conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that
any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” Id.; see also
State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 912, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In order to
find a violation of a defendant’s due process rights by virtue of an involuntary
confession, coercive police conduct is necessary.”).
“The proper inquiry is to look to the totality of the circumstances and then ask
whether the defendant’s will was overborne by the police conduct.” State v. Stone, 154
Idaho 949, 953, 303 P.3d 636, 640 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287;
State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 (1993)). Relevant factors to
consider in determining whether a defendant’s statements are voluntary include whether
Miranda warnings were given, the defendant’s age, education, and intelligence, the
length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and the use
of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep.

Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (internal citations omitted); Stone, 154 Idaho at
953, 303 P.3d at 640 (Idaho Court of Appeals utilizing the Bustamonte factors).
Importantly, the absence or presence of any one factor is not determinative. Id.
In this case, the district court denied Brown’s motion to suppress, concluding the
confession he made during his March 22, 2007 interview by Detective Long was
voluntary, not coerced. (R., pp.131-136.) After quoting the Court of Appeals’ rendition
of the relevant legal standards, including the Bustamonte factors (R., p.133 (but omitting
citation to Bustamonte)), the district court explained that the general circumstances of
the interview “weigh in favor of the voluntariness of the statements[,]” stating:

6

In this case Miranda [sic] warnings were given, and Brown was not
deprived of food or sleep.[2] The interrogation by Lieutenant Long was
thorough, but it was not unduly long. Long’s approach was low key and
made without threats. Brown appears to be of average intelligence and
according to statements made to the police has operated a successful
paralegal business.
Dr. Haugen testified that at the time of his
examination in 2008, Brown was of average intelligence, suffered from
depression, amphetamine dependency, had an anti-social personality,
was manipulative, was protective of others to get power and control, and
significantly, for purposes of this motion, was resistant to being
manipulated by others. These circumstances weigh in favor of the
voluntariness of the statements.
(R., p.134; see also 10/7/14 Tr., p.73, L.3 – p.74, L.25 (Dr. Haugen’s testimony).)
None of the district court’s general findings about Detective Long’s March 22, 2007
interview of Brown are challenged on appeal, and a review of that videotaped interview
(approximately 90 minutes) supports the court’s factual findings regarding the offer of
food and drink, Miranda warnings, the length of the interview, and the detective’s lowkey and non-threatening demeanor. (See generally Appellant’s Brief; St. Ex. 2.)
The district court next considered the “primary issue presented by Brown[,]” that
his confession was coerced because “the police threatened to arrest his wife if he did
not confess, thus rendering his confession involuntary.” (R., p.134.) The court opined:
In State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001) the
court set forth the law in this situation:
The second component of the interrogation that Schumacher
characterizes as coercive is Agent Richard’s statement that
Schumacher’s wife would be arrested if police found
evidence of her complicity and the agent’s reference to
Schumacher’s children.
Again, we find Schumacher’s
argument unpersuasive. It is true that threats to prosecute a
defendant’s loved one when there is no legitimate basis to
do so may be coercive and can render a confession
2

In a footnote, the district court explained, “[i]t was apparently chilly in the interrogation
room. However, the police offered food and beverages to Brown.” (R., p.134 n.1.)
7

involuntary. In State v. Davis, 115 Idaho 462, 464-65, 767
P.2d 837, 839-40 (Ct. App. 1989), for example, we held that
a confession was involuntary where a prosecutor had told
the defendant that his mother was being held due to the
defendant’s refusal to confess and where the charges
against the mother were later dismissed for lack of evidence.
However, a suspect’s confession is not involuntary merely
because it was motivated by the desire to prevent a good
faith arrest of a loved one.
Id., 136 Idaho at 517, 37 P.3d at 14 (citations omitted).
Here, Tyrah had already confessed to killing Braew [sic]. The
threat, express or implied, that she would be arrested was legitimate and
was in good faith. She was arrested and prosecuted. Even if Brown’s
confession was motivated by a desire to protect his wife, the confession is
not involuntary.
Brown raises a related issue that Lieutenant Long made an implicit
promise of leniency by telling him that he stepped up and did the right
thing by killing Braew [sic]. This attribution to Long is misleading and
incomplete. He stated that Brown had done the right thing “in your eyes.”
There is nothing in the statement that could be construed as a promise of
leniency. Moreover, if there was some belief on the part of Brown that a
promise had been made, he eventually received a benefit since the
charges were reduced to manslaughter.
(R., pp.134-135 (footnote omitted).)
The district court’s analysis is correct. In State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509,
37 P.3d 6 (Ct. App. 2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a situation where an
officer threatened to arrest Schumacher’s wife, if officers discovered evidence to justify
such an arrest, unless Schumacher confessed to cultivating marijuana. Id. at 517, 37
P.3d at 14. The court explained that “[i]t is true that threats to prosecute a defendant’s
loved one when there is no legitimate basis to do so may be coercive and can render a
confession involuntary,” but that the threat to Schumacher was “not unjustified.” Id.
The court concluded that the threat was not coercive because if the officers had
8

discovered evidence “linking Schumacher’s wife to the marijuana cultivation,” then
“[s]uch evidence, if found, would have justified her arrest.” Id. Similarly, in Brown’s
case, any suggestion by Detective Long that Tyrah would be arrested or prosecuted for
killing Mr. Breaw would have been valid because that is exactly what happened.
On March 20, 2007, Brown and his wife, Tyrah, were arrested in Florida on
warrants from Idaho for grand theft (Brown) and Montana (Tyrah), and they remained in
custody throughout their interviews with Detective Long over the next two days. (St. Ex.
1, 1:00-1:30; Def. Ex. A, 2:55-2:56; 10/7/14 Tr., p.56, Ls.1-13; p.60, Ls.1-5); see State v.
Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 427, 313 P.3d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 2013). At the time of Brown’s
March 22, 2007 interview by Detective Long, Tyrah was already in jail, having been
arrested on a Montana warrant; therefore, a threat to arrest her, by itself, would have
been insignificant. More importantly, on May 22, 2007, Tyrah was charged with first
degree murder (presumably of Mr. Breaw) in Bonner County, Idaho. See Idaho Data
Repository, State of Idaho vs. Tyrah Brea Harding,3 Bonner County District Court Case
No. CR-2007-0002885 (attached as Appendix A). The public record shows that Tyrah’s
first degree murder charge remained intact until January 9, 2009 -- well after she was
bound over to district court following a preliminary hearing -- when the state filed an
Amended Information charging her (only) with two less severe offenses to which she
pled guilty pursuant to a Rule 11 conditional plea agreement:

accessory to felony

harboring of a wanted felon and felony theft by receiving/possessing stolen property. Id.

3

Tyrah Brown’s mother’s last name is “Harding.” Brown, 155 Idaho at 427, 313 P.3d at
755.
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Brown’s argument that “Detective Long’s implied threats of prosecution or harm
to Tyra were unjustified[,]” and (similarly) that his “implied threats of consequences to
Tyrah were unfounded and unsupported at the time” (Appellant’s Brief, p.14), are
disproven by the facts. From May 22, 2007 until January 9, 2009 – over 19 months –
Tyrah faced the charge of first degree murder for killing Mr. Breaw. Even assuming,
arguendo, that during his March 22, 2007 interview with Brown, Detective Long
impliedly or expressly stated that Tyrah was going to be arrested and/or charged for the
murder of Mr. Breaw, he was absolutely correct. It would have been disingenuous for
the detective to suggest otherwise considering Tyrah confessed to the crime, admittedly
forged the $50,000 escrow check to Mr. Breaw, and fled with her husband to Florida.
In sum, Brown’s claim that his confession was coerced by false threats about
placing Tyrah in harm’s way or legal jeopardy is untenable, and should be rejected on
the same basis cited by the district court -- “The threat, express or implied, that she
would be arrested was legitimate and was in good faith.

She was arrested and

prosecuted.” (R., p.135 (emphasis added).) See Schumacher, 136 Idaho at 517, 37
P.3d at 14; United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 594-595 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“Involuntariness is present if there are threats or promises of illegitimate action,” but
statements that if parents were arrested, officers would have to place the children with
welfare authorities were true); State v. Bopp, 519 P.2d 1277, 1280-1281 (Or. App.
1974) (“the threat to arrest [the girlfriend] was not constitutionally objectionable coercion
because the officers threatened ‘only to do what the law permits them to do.’”).
On appeal, Brown also points to several concerns about Tyrah that he mentioned
to Detective Long during his first interview – five miscarriages, “her health and well10

being, . . . past struggles with drug abuse and suicide attempts.” (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.11-12.) Brown argues that, having heard, but not believed, Tyrah’s confession on
March 21st, the detective “manipulated Mr. Brown’s relationship with his wife” in the next
day’s interview by “justifying” Brown’s (presumed) actions “as simply protecting his
wife[,]” who had (according to Tyrah) been raped by Mr. Breaw. (Appellant’s Brief,
pp.12-13.)
First, Detective Long’s subjective belief about whether Tyrah’s confession was
truthful is not relevant to whether the detective could have truthfully (or in good faith)
told Brown that she could be arrested and/or charged with killing Mr. Breaw.

The

standard for whether probable cause to arrest exists is an objective one. “Subjective
intentions [of the officer] play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See also State v. Julian,
129 Idaho 133, 136-37, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062-63 (1996) (officer’s subjective beliefs
concerning probable cause determination are immaterial). Rather, as explained by the
Idaho Supreme Court, “[r]easonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the
officer possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to
believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person arrested is guilty.”
State v. Kysar, 116 Idaho 992, 993, 783 P.2d 859, 860 (1989) (citing State v. Alger, 100
Idaho 675, 603 P.2d 1009 (1979); State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 677 P.2d 522 (Ct. App.
1984)). Tyrah’s confession, her admitted forgery of the $50,000 escrow check to Mr.
Breaw, her flight with her husband from Idaho to Florida, and the fact that it was
unnecessary to prove which spouse actually shot Mr. Breaw to be charged as a
principal for murder, see I.C. § 18-204, show there was probable cause to arrest and
11

charge Tyrah for the homicide of Mr. Breaw. That Tyrah was in fact charged with the
first degree murder of Mr. Breaw and bound over to district court following a preliminary
hearing more than validates the good faith and legitimacy of any threat Detective Long
may have made to Brown that Tyrah could be arrested or charged for murder.
Next, it was Brown who brought up Tyrah’s past misfortunes during his interviews
with Detective Long.

Assuming Tyrah had the sympathy inducing problems Brown

described (five miscarriages, health issues, drug abuse, suicide attempts), they do not
show that Detective Long’s questions about Brown’s protective role over Tyrah were
coercive. A review of Brown’s March 22, 2007 interview shows that Detective Long
attempted to get Brown to admit that he shot and killed Mr. Breaw because he was
enraged that Mr. Breaw allegedly raped Tyrah, and Brown was (in his eyes) protecting
his wife from a rapist. Detective Long used Mr. Breaw’s alleged rape of Tyrah, as well
as Brown’s long-term caring for her troubled life, as a way to introduce the “wife
protection” theory to Brown in and make it more bearable for him to admit to the
homicide. In short, Tyrah’s other problems, most of which were introduced during the
interview by Brown, were either totally irrelevant or negligible in Detective Long’s
attempt to get Brown to confess to killing Mr. Breaw because he allegedly raped Tyrah.
Finally, upon review of the videotaped interview of Brown conducted on March
22, 2007, the state is unable to discern any point where Detective Long informed Brown
that Tyrah confessed to shooting Mr. Breaw herself, without Brown’s participation.
Brown’s argument that he was coerced into confessing that he alone killed Mr. Breaw –
not Brown’s vulnerable wife – is based on a fiction. Although Tyrah told Detective Long
on March 21, 2007 that she acted alone in committing and covering up the homicide of
12

Mr. Breaw, the detective was extremely careful to not relay that fact to Brown during his
March 22nd interview. Detective Long gave very general responses to Brown’s inquiries
about what Tyrah told him the day before. He explained, for example, that Tyrah “gave
us everything” about the money, the rape, and the murder.4 To the extent Brown’s

4

The following parts of the March 22 interview reflect how careful Detective Long was
to not disclose to Brown that Tyrah had confessed to killing Mr. Breaw herself:
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]

[Brown]
[Det. Long]

The truth of the matter is that we had Tyrah down here
yesterday.
Oh, okay.
She consented to a polygraph.
Okay.
And, um, she gave up everything.
What do you mean?
Everything. You know what I mean.
No, I don’t know what . . . what you mean.
....
You found out that Les had forced himself on her. . . . You
protected her. And she is with you because you’ve always
protected her, am I right?
....
I’m saying this went down because you love your wife. This
went down because you protect your wife. Idaho has it all
laid out, okay? We now, we now have Les, we now have
Les. He was murdered. Okay? We have everything, they
have everything.
....
You are a caring husband who defended your wife. Am I
wrong? . . . She told me she forged the check and you guys
took all that money and ran. You did it. They found Les. An
autopsy has been performed. They know everything that
happened. I want you, you need to save yourself. You need
to tell me you defended her because he forced himself on
her. You defended her. We know that. I know that. Idaho
knows that. Tyrah knows that, okay? It’s out there.
....
How, how do I know that . . . that Tyrah told you that?
....
She was here yesterday.
....
13

“coerced confession” argument relies on his assertion that he confessed to the homicide
because Detective Long informed him that his vulnerable wife confessed that she alone
killed Mr. Breaw, his argument fails. Instead, the taped interview shows Brown believed
that Tyrah implicated him for the homicide -- not that she accepted sole blame. (See n.
4, supra, especially emphasized part (in response to comment that Tyrah “told us the
truth,” Brown said, “So I’m the one that’s under suspicion of murder.”).) In sum, Brown’s
argument fails because it is not supported by the facts he relies upon.

[Brown]
[Det. Long]

[Brown]
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]
[Brown]
[Det. Long]

I said that I spoke to Tyrah and she made it right. She had
been all along denying everything and she gave me A to Z
last night. She told me soup to nuts everything that
happened.
Okay.
We have Les’s body. We know it’s a homicide, okay? The
problem is what was the homicide, what was the reason
behind it?
....
Tell me why the murder occurred. She already told me. I
want to hear the same thing from you. I’m not making this
up.
....
She admitted she forged the check ’cause you guys needed
to get out of town. It all fits Keith.
....
Tyrah already told us the truth. I want you to tell the truth too
so it’s there. . . .
So I’m the one that’s under suspicion of murder . . .
Yes sir.
Not Ty?
Well, you were both there, I believe.
Is that what she told you?
I’m not gonna tell you that part until you tell me . . . . I’ll
verify it if you tell me, but I’m not, I’m not gonna lead ya.

(St. Ex. 2: 03:00 – 17:00 (emphasis added).)
14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s opinion
and order denying Brown’s motion to suppress, and affirm his judgment of conviction
and sentences.
DATED this 27th day of April, 2016.

/s/ John C. McKinney____________________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day of April, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ John C. McKinney_____________________

JCM/dd

JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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